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  Studies: Biased Science in Tobacco Control
Posted on Sunday, November 26 @ 08:29:34 EST by samantha
 
 
  The World I noticed something disturbing. The study showed evidence of a severe investigator bias -- one that raises serious questions about the scientific objectivity of the tobacco control movement.





Study: Anti-smoking ads have opposite effect on teens
07/19/07
By ANDREA JONES, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution
The more exposure middle school students have to anti-smoking ads, the more likely they are to smoke, according to a new University of Georgia study.
Hye-Jin Paek, an assistant professor at UGA, found that many anti-smoking ad campaigns have the opposite effect on teenagers, backfiring because they actually encourage the rebellious nature of youth.
"They don't want to hear what they should do or not do," Paek said. Instead, she said, ads should focus on convincing teens their friends are heeding the anti-smoking warning because peer pressure has the most direct effect.
Paek and co-author Albert Gunther from the University of Wisconsin-Madison examined surveys from 1,700 middle school students about their exposure to anti-smoking ads and their intention to smoke. The study will be published in the August issue of the journal "Communication Research."
The study is the latest in a string of research showing that anti-smoking campaigns often have ad little to no impact on teens. In 2002, a study commissioned by an anti-smoking foundation found tobacco manufacturer Philip Morris' youth anti-smoking campaign was making students more likely to smoke.
Paek said the data showed middle school students are more like to be influenced by the perception of what their friends are doing, and that anti-smoking campaigns should be more focused on peer relations.
"Rather than saying, 'don't smoke,' it is better to say, "your friends are listening to this message and not smoking," she said. "It doesn't really matter what their peers are actually doing."
Read

'Is it a trusted source?'
Tobacco control resources cause debate in health care community
By Stacie Crozier
Jan. 11, 2007
Are all tobacco control materials and resources created equal?

That's a question that researchers, public health officials, health care professionals and even The New York Times are raising as tobacco companies produce and distribute tobacco prevention and smoking cessation materials to the health care community and the public.
"It seems incongruent with the mission of a dental office to display or use materials provided by companies who produce a product that when used as intended can kill you," says Cathy Backinger, Ph.D., acting chief, Tobacco Control Research Branch, National Cancer Institute.
She cautions dentists to carefully evaluate the entities that produce tobacco control resources and materials. "Is it a trusted source?"
Materials available from the National Cancer Institute, she adds, have been shown through scientific research to be effective tools in helping smokers quit.
Smokers who want to quit and parents who want to prevent their children from smoking have a variety of resources at their disposal proven to be effective tools, she says.
"There are some 45 million smokers and we need to have a variety of ways to help them quit," Dr. Backinger says. "Brochures are helpful for some; interactive phone quitlines and online resources provide support; physicians and dentists can provide counsel and, consistent with applicable state law, prescription medications to help. Not every individual responds to one method, but there are a variety of choices out there, and we hope they choose materials from a trusted source."
In November 2006, when Dr. Backinger heard reports of dental offices displaying and distributing QuitAssist materials produced by Philip Morris USA, she sent a letter to ADA President Kathleen Roth.
"Dental offices are a prime location to promote the health importance of both tobacco prevention and cessation. The implied endorsement of the Philip Morris QuitAssist materials is incompatible with the aims of dental offices that are concerned with patients' oral health," she wrote. "The tobacco industry markets a product that is both highly addictive and lethal under normal conditions of use. Thus, dental professionals' goal of oral health and those of the tobacco industry are fundamentally different and irreconcilable."
Philip Morris USA spokesman David Sutton says health care providers and consumers can request free QuitAssist materials from the company or obtain them on the PMUSA Web site.
The company in 2006 also distributed 2.4 million guides to U.S. dental offices through a third-party vendor. Since the QuitAssist program was launched in 2003, its Web site has logged more than 1.5 million visits and it has been promoted through "onserts" on more than 750 million packs of the company's cigarettes.
"We want to make health care professionals and the public aware of the resources we offer and the opportunity for them to obtain more," says Mr. Sutton. "We are trying to raise awareness of our smoking cessation efforts."
In her letter to Dr. Roth, Dr. Backinger said tobacco products are responsible for more than 440,000 American deaths each year.
"Because tobacco use is responsible for about 30 percent of all cancer deaths, efforts to prevent and control tobacco use are a very high priority for the National Cancer Institute. Recently, some tobacco companies have sought to portray themselves as interested in helping to prevent youth smoking, or in helping adults to quit. … Some individuals may benefit from cessation information provided by Philip Morris. However, many more will suffer, so long as the company's aggressive marketing efforts continue."
According to the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, the tobacco industry spent $15.1 billion to market and promote tobacco products in 2003—a 21.5 percent increase from the 2002 figure of $12.47 billion and a 125 percent increase since tobacco companies and states reached tobacco settlement agreements in November 1998 that placed restrictions on tobacco industry marketing.
(The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement was signed with 46 states, five U.S. territories and the District of Columbia. Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi and Texas had previously signed settlement agreements. All the agreements combined are known as the state Tobacco Settlement Agreements.)
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has set recommended levels that states should spend on tobacco control activities—about 8 percent of approximately $20 billion in settlement funds received each year. According to CDC data, only three states currently fund tobacco prevention programs at recommended levels. Less than half (22 states) fund programs at less than 25 percent of recommended levels—with five states spending none of their settlement funds on such programs.
"State legislatures decide how to use tobacco settlement funds," says Dr. Backinger. "They can and do use them for a variety of things not related to tobacco control."
A study published in the December 2006 issue of the American Journal of Public Health showed "little relation" between exposure to tobacco company-sponsored, youth-targeted ads and youth smoking outcomes. But ads targeted to parents but viewed by older teens may actually increase teen smoking and reduce their perceptions of danger about smoking, researchers concluded.
The study focused on parent-directed ads from Philip Morris USA and youth-directed ads from Phillip Morris and Lorillard Tobacco Co.
"Adolescents need accurate information about the serious health consequences of smoking, and they should be wary of tobacco marketing that portrays smoking as cool and glamorous," says Melanie Wakefield, Ph.D., lead researcher and author of the study. "An important thing that parents can do to prevent their kids from smoking is to set a good example and quit smoking themselves. Or, if they don't smoke, make their homes and cars smoke-free."
Dr. Wakefield, a behavioral scientist, is director of the Centre for Behavioural Research in Cancer for the Cancer Council Victoria, in Melbourne, Australia. The study was supported by grants from the National Cancer Institute State and Community Tobacco Control Initiative, the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
"Parents can also support smoke-free laws, tobacco tax increases, tobacco advertising bans and funding for real tobacco prevention and quitting programs sponsored by state and federal governments," Dr. Wakefield adds.
A statement on PMUSA's Web site regarding the AJPH study and its television ad campaign, "Talk. They'll Listen," says, "Based on June 2006 research, 61 percent of parents of kids 10 to 17 years old reported being aware of at least one ad from the campaign. Of those aware, 61 percent reported having talked to their child about not smoking as a result of seeing the ad."
Philip Morris USA established its Youth Smoking Prevention Program in April 1998—about seven months before tobacco companies signed the Master Settlement Agreement.
Since the YSP program's inception, PMUSA has pumped about $1 billion into the program, over and above the $30 billion it has sent to the states during the last eight years through Tobacco Settlement Agreements, says Mr. Sutton.
"We believe that kids should not smoke," says Mr. Sutton. "This is a product intended for adults only, and we put our money where our mouth is."
YSP encompasses a variety of activities, including research and research reviews on youth behavior and smoking rates, parent communications, grant programs, and a variety of strategies designed to prevent youth from gaining access to tobacco products, Mr. Sutton says.
The program's parent resources were created in conjunction with an advisory board of psychologists, psychiatrists and public health professionals, chaired by Lawrence Kutner, Ph.D., clinical psychologist; lecturer, Harvard Medical School Department of Psychiatry; and president, Health Communications Consultants Inc. Dr. Kutner is a former columnist on child development and parent-child communication for The New York Times and Parents magazine, and author of five books on those topics.
"Our advisory board is an independent group that works to ensure the scientific accuracy and developmental appropriateness of the print and online materials for parents funded by the PMUSA Youth Smoking Prevention program," says Dr. Kutner. "Our goal is to provide accurate, practical and effective resources that parents can use to help prevent kids from using tobacco in any of its forms."
Dr. Kutner says that in addition to the health consequences of smoking he's seen clinically, he works in youth smoking prevention and smoking cessation for a more personal reason.
"Both of my parents were smokers," he notes. "Both died from smoking-related cancers by the time I was 18 years old. I know the health consequences of smoking. No child should have to deal with that."
The advisory board, he says, has no involvement in television campaigns for PMUSA print and online materials.
"We're providing our expertise to parents," Dr. Kutner adds. "PMUSA is getting the same advice and counsel we would provide to any youth smoking prevention group. As independent consultants, each of us would walk away from the project if we ever feel that our advice is being either ignored or misused. I was initially concerned that this effort at youth smoking prevention might be a ruse, and that our advice would be ignored. Other members of the advisory board initially had the same concerns—indeed, I'd be suspicious of any health care professional who did not."
PMUSA's financial resources, he says, have served to "distribute approximately 70 million co pies of our brochures through a variety of channels—numbers that most youth smoking prevention programs can only dream about."
Philip Morris has placed paid advertisement inserts promoting the free parent brochures and tip sheets in their "Raising Kids Who Don't Smoke" series in a variety of health trade publications, including the November 2006 Journal of the American Dental Association.
Dr. Scott L. Tomar raised an objection to the insert in a letter to JADA Editor Michael Glick.
"Philip Morris' advertising campaign focuses on peer influence, parental factors and commercial access being the primary influences on youth smoking initiation, rather than tobacco industry marketing, inaccurate risk appraisal, price and other factors known to influence youth smoking," wrote Dr. Tomar, professor and chair, Department of Community Dentistry and Behavioral Science, University of Florida College of Dentistry. He opined that, "The available evidence suggests that not only is this tobacco industry campaign not effective in reducing youth smoking, it was associated with lowering youths' perceived harm of smoking."
Even The New York Times has weighed in recently on the issue. An editorial in its Nov. 27, 2006, issue, states, "Philip Morris says it has spent more than $1 billion on its youth smoking prevention programs since 1998 and that it devised its current advertising campaign on the advice of experts who deem parental influence extremely important. But the company has done only the skimpiest research on how the campaign is working. …
"Philip Morris, the industry's biggest and most influential company, is renowned for its marketing savvy," the Times editorial adds. "If it really wanted to prevent youth smoking—and cut off new recruits to its death-dealing products—it could surely mount a more effective campaign to do so."
In a published response to the editorial, Jennifer Hunter, vice president, Youth Prevention and Corporate Responsibility Programs for Philip Morris USA, said, "We understand the skepticism regarding how a tobacco company can be serious about preventing youth from smoking, but our business is grounded in competing for the largest share of the adult tobacco market. As a business and as parents, we don't want kids to smoke, and when society feels that we behave otherwise, it actually harms our business. … While we have serious concerns about the design and conclusions of the study cited in your editorial, the study does highlight the need for continued understanding of how parent-directed youth smoking prevention advertising affects youth. We intend to pursue this issue and to engage with relevant experts to identify opportunities to improve all youth smoking prevention efforts, especially our own."
Read

The tyranny of the majority

December 28, 2006
By Jordan Mueller

State Sen.-elect Sharon Ropes was recently quoted by the Daily News as saying something to the effect of “government has a responsibility to protect its citizens from pollution and hazardous materials.” I fully agree with that statement, and I think it pretty much goes without saying that nobody should be forced to suffer the disgusting and harmful effects of secondhand smoke.

But Ms. Ropes and others’ support of a statewide smoking ban in bars and restaurants based on this premise indicates faulty reasoning. A legal ban in these places does not actually address the issue of smokers’ versus nonsmokers’ rights. This is a matter of property owners’ rights.

We refer to bars and restaurants as “public” places because people go there, but they are actually privately owned businesses. If there were a demand for smoke-free establishments, then owners would ban the practice voluntarily — as many already have. Some have not, indicating the demand for places where smoking is permitted, but those bothered by secondhand smoke are free to avoid the latter. This is why a legal ban in all the rest would go far beyond simply protecting nonsmokers’ rights. It would create a special privilege for them by giving them an even greater variety of smoke-free dining, drinking and employment choices. This of course would be at the expense of telling business owners that neither they nor their guests would be allowed to smoke within the confines of their own property.

I think deep down most reasonable people understand that this is simply not compatible with the American values of liberty and limited government. It would be, in fact, a pretty good (albeit somewhat trivial) example of what Jeffersonians in early America tried to warn us about when they spoke of “tyranny of the majority” —the unintended use of democracy as a means of crushing individual rights. Human nature is such that people will try to use government as a tool to advance personal interests, which is why it is so important that lawmakers must carefully consider doing what’s right rather than what’s popular.
Read

The Case Against Smoking Bans

THOMAS ANDREW LAMBERT
University of Missouri at Columbia - School of Law


U of Missouri-Columbia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-11
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol. 13, 2006


Abstract:
In recent months, numerous localities and states have banned smoking in public places (i.e., privately owned places to which members of the public are invited). Such sweeping bans are typically justified on grounds that they alleviate externalities, shape individuals' preferences in a desirable manner, and reduce risks. This essay rebuts the externality, preference-shaping, and risk-reduction arguments for smoking bans and contends that such bans are unnecessary and, on the whole, utility-reducing.
Read

The Case Against Smoking Bans
By Thomas A. Lambert


IN MY VIEW: Anti-Smoking Groups' Claims are Making a Mockery of Secondhand Smoke Science; Years of My Own Research Being Thrown Down the Drain

December 16, 2006
By Michael Siegel
In their zeal to scare people about acute cardiovascular effects of secondhand smoke that do not exist in order to promote public support for smoking bans, anti-smoking groups have engaged in what essentially amounts to a strategy of misrepresenting the science: taking evidence of minor, transient, physiologic effects and telling the public that this translates into major, permanent, clinically significant damage to healthy nonsmokers.

The claims have ranged from severe exaggerations to complete absurdity, but they all have one thing in common: they are distorting and misrepresenting the science.

The groups involved range from the smallest of anti-smoking organizations to the largest and most prominent figure in tobacco control - the Surgeon General himself.

Anti-smoking groups have told the public that 30 minutes of secondhand smoke is enough to cause hardening of the arteries. They have told the public that 30 minutes of exposure reduces coronary blood flow and deprives the heart of life-giving blood. They have told the public that brief secondhand smoke exposure causes reduced oxygen delivery that is comparable to that observed in cyanotic heart disease. They have even told the public that just 30 seconds of secondhand smoke is enough to make coronary artery function in nonsmokers indistinguishable from that in chronic active smokers.

The net effect of all of these deceptive and inaccurate claims is to undermine the true scientific basis for tobacco control policy, especially for the regulation of smoking in public places and workplaces. By virtually making up the science as they go along, these anti-smoking groups (or at least those feeding them the misleading information) are not only destroying the scientific credibility and integrity of the tobacco control movement, but they are also rendering as meaningless the years of research into the effects of secondhand smoke that scientists like myself have conducted.

What good is all the research that I've conducted on the actual hazards of secondhand smoke when anti-smoking groups are going to tell the public that a few whiffs of tobacco smoke can cause atherosclerosis? What value is there in my research when these groups are going to tell the public that brief exposure to secondhand smoke causes as much damage to the heart as years of active smoking?

What exactly is the purpose of conducting careful scientific research on the effects of secondhand smoke if anti-smoking groups are essentially just going to make things up, making whatever claims they want to the public in order to embellish the emotional appeal of the message?

Why am I needed anymore? If the groups are going to say that 30 minutes of tobacco smoke causes hardening of the arteries, then who needs to know exactly what the actual risk of chronic secondhand smoke exposure on heart disease is? If the groups are going to say that even a minor dose of secondhand smoke causes as much damage as a lifetime of active smoking, then why do we need to know what the actual levels of secondhand smoke exposure are for workers in different occupational settings?

In many ways, I feel that the nonsense that is going on in the tobacco control movement has made a mockery of my own career in tobacco control. Had I known 15 years ago that we were going to send a widespread message to the public that brief exposure to secondhand smoke can cause heart disease, then I would never have devoted the past 15 years of my career to researching the actual health effects of secondhand smoke.

What importance is there to knowing the actual health effects of secondhand smoke if we are going to deceive the public about what those health effects are?

One of the reasons that the events of the past several months sadden me so much is that it renders my research meaningless. What value did I add to the movement by carefully documenting the levels of exposure of restaurant workers and the health effects of chronic secondhand smoke exposure if these groups are simply going to tell people that 30 seconds of exposure is enough to kill anyone?

It makes me feel like all of my efforts were a waste, or at least, that my research is virtually worthless (at least irrelevant) at this point.

I remember being disturbed at a tobacco trial once when the tobacco industry attorneys kept standing up and objecting to my testimony on the grounds that it was "irrelevant and immaterial."

Well right now I feel as though my testimony about the health effects of secondhand smoke and what the evidence actually shows is "irrelevant and immaterial" because the anti-smoking groups are going to push their pre-ordained agenda regardless of what the evidence actually shows. They are going to make whatever claims they feel they need to in order to garner support for their increasingly draconian proposals, even if those claims defy the research, the science, and common sense.

So the tobacco company lawyers were right - my testimony, knowledge, and expertise in this area truly is irrelevant at this point. Once anti-smoking groups are telling the public that 30 minutes of exposure is enough to cause atherosclerosis, I don't really feel like I'm needed anymore.

And I think that's the truth: I'm not needed anymore.

More than that, I'm not wanted any more. When I was generating evidence that could be used to support the agenda, I was very much wanted in the movement. But now that I'm questioning the tactics and statements being used to promote the agenda (which I largely support) and questioning aspects of the agenda itself, I'm no longer wanted. There really isn't any room for someone like me in the tobacco control movement.

In fact, I'm a grave danger to the movement, because my parents instilled a value in me which I refuse to reqlinquish: something called the truth.

There really is not any room in the movement for someone who speaks the truth and refuses to shade the truth in order to follow the party line. There is simply no place for a person like me in this movement. When you speak the truth, you're forced out of the movement because you become a threat to it.

So now I join the tobacco company attorneys in standing to voice objection to the value of my own research and testimony: "Irrelevant and immaterial," I say.
Read

Biased Science in Tobacco Control: A Re-Evaluation of a 1997 Study on Secondhand Smoke and Heart Disease

November 22, 2006
By Michael Siegel
I recently re-examined an article that is widely cited by tobacco control groups as supporting the contention that chronic exposure to secondhand smoke causes heart disease -- a claim that, right off the bat, I acknowledge I think is scientifically sound. However, in re-evaluating the article, I noticed something disturbing. The study showed evidence of a severe investigator bias -- one that raises serious questions about the scientific objectivity of the tobacco control movement.

The paper, published in 1997 in the British Medical Journal (BMJ), is entitled "Environmental tobacco smoke exposure and ischaemic heart disease: An evaluation of the evidence" (see Law MR, Morris RK, Wald NJ. BMJ 1997; 315:973-980).

The article presents a meta-analysis of 19 "acceptable" published studies of the risk of heart disease among nonsmokers living with smokers versus nonsmokers, and reports a pooled relative risk of 1.30 (95% confidence interval, 1.22-1.38).

The Rest of the Story

I was curious as to what represented an "acceptable" study. It turns out that there were 21 studies identified that met the inclusion criteria for the meta-analysis. However, the authors deemed that two studies (references 35 and 36 in the paper) were not acceptable and excluded these studies from the meta-analysis.

Nowhere in the methods section of this article does it state the reasons why these two studies were excluded. Nor are there any objective criteria offered by which the inclusion or exclusion decision was to be made.

Instead, in the discussion section of the paper, the following explanation for the decision to excluded these two studies is offered:

"A separate analysis of one of the studies of environmental tobacco smoke exposure and ischaemic heart disease in the set of 19 studies (fig 1), and of two data sets not published elsewhere (from the US National Center for Health Statistics and the American Cancer Society) has been published by Layard and LeVois, consultants to the tobacco industry. They reported a combined relative risk estimate from the three studies of 1.00, with a narrow 95% confidence interval (0.97 to 1.04). This negative result is statistically inconsistent with the estimate of 1.30 (1.22 to 1.38) from the above analysis of 19 studies (P

To be completely honest, this reasoning was quite shocking to me. Essentially, what the paper is saying is that an "acceptable" paper is one that contributes to finding an effect of secondhand smoke on heart disease, while an "unacceptable" paper is one which finds no such effect.

In other words, what the paper is explaining is that these two studies were excluded specifically because they failed to find a significant increase in heart disease risk associated with secondhand smoke exposure!

This paper has committed perhaps the most egregious possible cardinal sin of a meta-analysis: making a decision about what studies to include or exclude after the fact and based on the results, rather than on the methodologic aspects of the study. If you conduct your meta-analysis first among studies you know to support your pre-determined conclusion and then you exclude from the meta-analysis any specific studies that you know not to support that conclusion, then you are automatically guaranteed of concluding your pre-determined conclusion!

I don't know how something like this passed peer review. However, mistakes like this are sometimes made. The point is not how the mistake was made but the fact that the article would use this type of reasoning in the first place.

Think about it this way: you have a collection of studies, most of which support your hypothesis, but several of which do not. You have two choices. First, you can combine all the studies together. If you do that, there is a risk that the negative studies will wash out (negate) or dilute the positive ones. Second, you can combine the positive ones to derive an estimate of the effect and then show that the negative studies are inconsistent with that finding. Then, you argue against including the negative studies because they are inconsistent. This is precisely the reasoning that was used in this paper.

Before discussing the implications, let me first make several points to dispel comments that I know some will make:

1. I am not arguing here that secondhand smoke does not cause heart disease. I think that even including the two studies that were excluded, if you look at Figure 1 in the paper you'll see that there is still an overall finding of a small increased heart disease risk among those exposed to secondhand smoke.

2. I am not arguing here that the two studies that were excluded should not necessarily have been excluded. There may be valid methodologic reasons to exclude these papers. However, any such methodologic flaws are not the reason provided for why these papers were excluded.

3. That the studies in question were published by authors with tobacco industry ties is not the reason given by the paper for excluding them. Even if it were, the nature of the funding is probably not sufficient reason to exclude the studies. But the point is moot, because the article makes it clear that the two studies were excluded not because they were commissioned by the industry, but because they failed to find positive results.

This paper represents a revelation to me. It really is a revelation for me, because it is something that I previously failed to look closely at - I assumed that a paper of this nature, published in a journal like BMJ, would naturally have used reasonable criteria for study inclusion and exclusion. It would never have occurred to me that the paper would have made the decision about excluding studies after the positive studies were combined and that the decision would be based on whether or not a study found an effect or not.

There are several important implications of this revelation.

First, it suggests that there is a serious bias inherent in the tobacco control movement, one which raises serious concerns about the scientific objectivity of the movement.

I have already expressed similar concerns based on the fallacious claims being made by a large number of anti-smoking groups about the acute cardiovascular effects of secondhand smoke. But this is the first instance in which I have found blatant scientific bias in the literature on the chronic effects of secondhand smoke.

Second, it suggests that the tobacco control movement has a crisis of scientific integrity on its hands. We need to respond to this crisis immediately and definitively in order to reclaim our scientific integrity and to prevent any loss of scientific credibility.

Third, it suggests that the loss of objectivity in tobacco control is something that is not restricted to the past eighteen months - a time period during which I have been documenting numerous examples of
misrepresentation of the science by anti-smoking groups, including by the Surgeon General. This particular story would have made my blog headlines in 1997, if I had a blog at that time (or even knew what a blog was).

Finally, it reminds us that the peer review process, while an essential and usually an effective one, is not perfect. As I teach my students, one must always take the time to critically evaluate any published study, no matter how prestigious the journal. There is no substitute for careful evaluation of the published literature. The scientific review process must not end when the journal's peer review process ends.
Read


IN MY VIEW: Anti-Smoking Movement Has Lost High Ground in Public Debate






 
 
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